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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JEAN SEELEY (PARK),
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
13643

LEO P. PARK,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises out of the efforts of a divorced
woman to force her ex-husband to make child support
payments, both those in arrears and those coming due
in the future. The action was initiated by the woman's
motion to the District Court for an order finding the
ex-husband in contempt for having failed to pay child
support payments in the amount of $40.00 per month
according to a previous order of the court, and for a
judgment in the amount of the arrearages in accrued
child support.
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DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The Court heard argument on Plaintiffs motions
and issued its order awarding judgment to the plaintiff
in the amount of $5,800.00 as the total amount of arrearages in past due child support payments and ordering
defendant to pay to the Plaintiff $50.00 per month child
support, $10.00 of which is to be credited to the arrearages. The court further ordered "that the Statute of
Limitations does not apply in this case."
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the order of the District
Court which establishes "that the Statute of Limitations does not apply in this case," and, upon reversal
of such order, Defendant seeks recomputation of the
arrearages in chuld support and a revision of the District Court's Judgment against the Defendant to reflect
application of the Statute of Limitations which this
court finds to apply in this case, or in the alternative
remand to District Court with directions to redetermine
arrearages in accordance with decision herein and to
issue judgment reflecting the result of such redetermination.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were divorced 7 October 1959, and at
that time the Defendant was ordered to pay the Plaintiff
child support and alimony. Subsequently the Plaintiff
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remarried and the Defendent was relieved of paying alimony. The Defendant has been in arrears in his child
support payments one hundred and forty-five months
or approximately twelve years.
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COUET ERRED IN ITS JUDGMENT
AWARDING PLAINTIFF $5,800.00, BECAUSE THE
COURT'S COMPUTATION OF DEFENDANT'S ARREARAGES IN BACK CHILD SUPPORT WAS ERRONEOUS.

The record shows that by judgment rendered 10
March 1960 based on stipulation of the parties, the defendant owed the plaintiff $260.00. (See Pages 21 and 23
of the Court Record) in unpaid child support and alimony through 6 March 1960. By this date the plaintiff
had remarried and relinquished her claim to alimony.
From 7 March 1960 through 6 December 1973 a total
of 165 months had passed, and at $40.00 per month for
the period, the total amount of accrued child support
payments comes to $6,600.00. Of that amount the affidavit of the plaintiff at pages 31 and 32 of the court
record admits payments by the defendant during the
period of about $770.00, some part of which was received
"within the last month" and $600.00 of which appears
to have been received since plaintiff moved to Colorado
but before she suffered a fire loss. The record is not
clear on this point, but the affidavit seems to place
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such payments as having been relatively recently made.
By subtracting $700.00 from $6,600.00 one gets $5,830.00
or by rounding, $5,800.00.
Such computation is in error, because it fails, in
accordance with the order of the court, to apply the
Statute of Limitations to the computation.
In computing the amount of arrearages, one is concerned only with accrued installments which have not
been paid by the defendant. For this reason it is error
to consider in this appeal the divorce decree which ordered that some certain amount be paid monthly to the
plaintiff by the defendant.
It is admitted that such a decree is modifiable in
many respects, but in so far as the amount of any single
accrued installment is concerned, the court is powerless
to change it. The amount of an installment becomes
fixed and finally determined once that installment becomes due and payable. Myers v. Myers (1923) 62 Utah
90, 218 P. 123. Any discussion of laches, Statute of
Limitations, or any other defense in relation to the decree which established the requirement to pay monthly
installments is deceiving and not in point here.
Utah Code Ann., Section 30-3-5 (Supp. 1973) does
not apply to accrued monthly installments when it
says, "The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to
make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the parties, the
custody of the children and their support and mainten-
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ance, or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary/' but is rather talking about
things prospectively including future alimony and child
support payments.
Changes in the amount of support can only be made
with respect to future payments which may accrue under
the terms of the divorce decree, the Court being powerless to alter the amounts which have accrued in favor
of a party prior to the time of the making of an order.
Cole v. Cole, 101 Utah 355, 122 P.2d 201, and cases there
cited.
There are four possible answers to the question of
whether or not the Statute of Limitations applies to
actions involving attempts to obtain payments of overdue installments of child support (and by analogy Alimony); (a) Neither laches nor the Statute of Limitations applies, (b) Laches applies exclusively, (c) Statute of Limitations applies exclusively, (d) Both laches
and the Statute of Limitations may apply in a particular
case.
The public policy of the law is to avoid stale claims
and to finally put to rest all litigation, and such policy
mitigates against a conclusion that neither Laches nor
the Statute of Limitations applies.
Defendant concedes that as a general proposition
the doctrine of laches is appropriate to actions similar to
the one which resulted in the judgnmet being appealed
herein. Kaiser v. Kaiser, (1921), 213 Mich. 660, 181 N.W.
993; Herzog v. Bramel, (1933), 82 Utah 216, 223, 23 P.2d
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345; Smith v. Smith, (1930), 77 Utah 60, 291 P. 298;
Hollis v. Bryan, (1932), 166 Miss. 874, 143 So. 689; McGill v. McGill, (1917), 100 Kan 324, 166 P. 501.
The Statute of Limitations in the State of Utah
applies by its terms to all civil actions without regard to
whether or not they are actions at law or actions at
equity. "Civil actions can be commenced only within
the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the causes
of actions shall have accrued, . . ." Sec. 78-12-1, U.C.A.
(1953). "The sought enforcement of the order or decree
with respect to the payment of the decreed alimony (is)
. . . a proceeding civil in nature, . . ." Herzog v. Bramel,
82 Utah 216, 223, 23 P.2d 345.
This case arose out of efforts of plaintiff to enforce
a divorce decree in so far as it ordered the payment of
child support, so by Herzog above, it and other cases
like it are civil and subject to the statute of limitations.
Since the defense of the statute of limitations must
be pleaded, the defendant often is in control of whether
or not in a particular case it is used exclusively, but in
the general case it seems obvious that both Laches and
the Statute of Limitations may be pleaded for consideration by the court, and often when only Latches is
pleaded the court will weigh its appropriateness in a
particular case against a Statute of Limitations.
In considering which of the specific periods of limitations apply to the present case we should observe what
has taken place.
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When a court awards a decree of divorce it often
awards either or both alimony and child support in
indefinite amount to be paid over an indeterminate
period in monthly installments of a fixed amount. In
rendering such a decree the court retains authority over
the matter until the alimony and child support obligations end, but until that time the court may by its
equity power make any modifications to the amounts of
future payments it desires. The court however, has no
power whatsoever to alter the amounts of such payments
which have accrued, whether paid or not. It was the decree that awarded the amount of each monthly installment and such amount may be changed from time to
time, so in that sense the decree is not final. The decree,
however, becomes final as to each installment as that
installment becomes due and payable. It is for this
reason that to say that "orders for child support payments are not judgments" recognizes only half the fact
and misses the problem entirely.
If one concentrates on only the single accrued and
unpaid installment of child support, which has been
said to be a lien as it became due, and if he considers the
effect of the plaintiffs failure over an extended period
to foreclose the lien, it becomes evident that at some
point she should be estopped from doing so. Openshaw
v. Openshaw, (1943), 105 Utah 574, 144 R2d 528. It is
only when one thinks of the sum total of all accrued
installments that he is confused.
A search of the Sections of Chapter 78-12, Utah Code
Annotated discloses no statutory time limit expressly
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applicable to bringing actions to enforce payment of
child support or alimony, but there is Section 78-12-25,
Utah Code Annotated which prescribes in subparagraph
(2) a four year limitation for "An action for relief not
otherwise provided by law." Applying this limitation
period would result in a maximum awardable arrearage
of $1,820.00, but if the $770.00 amount admittedly paid by
the defendant had been paid during the most recent four
years, the maximum awardable amount would have to
be reduced to $1,150.00.
Section 78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, prescribes
an eight year limitation during which an action based
on "a judgment or decree" may be brought. Applying
this period of limitation would result in a maximum
awardable arrearage of $3,840.00, and again if the $770.00
admittedly paid by the defendant had been paid during
the most recent eight years, the maximum awardable
amount would have to be reduced to $3,040.00.
Certainly, since the general Statute of Limitations
is by its own terms applicable to all court actions, one of
the periods of limitations specified therein must be applicable to actions to recover arrearages in child support
and alimony, therefore, it is submitted that one or the
other of the above provisions of limitations applies to
cases similar to the present case. Since Section 78-12-25
is both the most severe against a plaintiff and by its
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terms a catchall provision for any situation not otherwise covered, we should first explore the applicability
of Section 78-12-22.
Applying the analysis found at page 29, 49 C.J.S.,
Judgments, to accrued installments of alimony and child
support it must be concluded that such accrued installments are more like judgments than they are like orders:
"Judgments generally are distinguished from
rules or orders in that a judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties ending the
suit, whereas a rule or order is an interlocutory
determination of some subsidiary or collateral matter, not disposing of the merits."
The acrual of an installment finally determines the
rights of the parties in the amount of the installment
and thus ends all debate on the subject. The suit is
finished. There is no more issue as to that installment.
Other sources confirm this conclusion. "Judgment"
as used in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure includes
a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. See
Rule 54 (a). A decree is a judgment of a court of equity
and may be interlocutory or final. Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1968. An order is a decision
on a motion, while a judgment is a decision on a trial.
Cox v. Dixie Power Co., 81 Utah 94, 16 P.2d 916. Before
the court in the present case established the amount
of the installments generally there was a trial. He
issued a decree. Such decree was interlocutory in those
respects dealing with future child support, because the
amount of such support was subject to change. The
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amount of any one installment was left undecided until
the day it became due. In effect the decree as it related
to that one installment became final on that day, and it
was the result of a trial, but it could have been the result
of an order. It really doesn't matter, because, if it is an
order, on the day the installment accrues it becomes an
order to pay a specific amount of money to the plaintiff, and Rule 7(b) ((2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
states, "An order for the payment of money may be
enforced by execution in the same manner as if it were
a judgment." The effect is the same whether the installment be considered a judgment or an order.
Kansas law recognizes such a conclusion: "It is well
settled that where alimony or child support is ordered
paid in installments, each installment when due is to
be regarded as a judgment taking effect as of the date
due (Sharp v. Sharp, 154 Kan. 175, 117 P.2d 561; Burnap
v. Burnap, 144 Kan. 568, 61 P.2d 899), . . ." McKee v.
McKee, (1941), 154 Kan. 340, 114 P.2d 544.
Washington State has come to a similar result. The
court there held that, "As each separate installment
awarded by a divorce decree for support of a minor child
of the parties constitutes a judgment as it becomes due,
. . ." Schumacher v. Schumacher, (1946), 26 Wash. 23,
172 P.2d 841, 812.
Other states have concluded that installments of
alimony and child support are judgments when they
became due, and such states are indicated by the following citations to cases standing for the proposition: Arndt
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v. Burghardt, (1917), 165 Wis. 312, 162 N.W. 317; Simmons v. Simmons, (1940),
S.D
, 290 N.W. 319;
Simonton v. Simonton, (1920), 33 Idaho 255, 193 P. 386;
Bennett v. Tomlinson, (1928), 206 Iowa 1075, 221 N.W,
837; Gaston v. Gaston, (1896), 114 Cal 542, 46 Pac 609;
Kaiser v. Kaiser, (1921), 213 Mich 660, 181 N.W. 993.
Even in Utah the Supreme Court has held that a
"Divorce decree for payment of alimony operates as a
judgment lien as to all past due and unpaid installments." Openshaw v. Openshaw, (1943), 105 Utah 574,
144 P.2d 528.
Having now established that an individual accrued
installment is a judgment, it follows that Section 78-1222, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, applies in the present
case.
When does the statute of limitations commence
running? It starts running when the judgment becomes
final, and the judgment became final the day on which
the installment became due and payable. The court in
McKee v. McKee, (1941), 154 Kan. 340, 118 P.2d 544, in
addition to showing that child support payments which
are in arrears take on the characteristics of judgments
went on to say ". . . that the statute of limitations, G.S.
1935,60-606, Par 6, begins to run as of that date (the date
the support payment becomes due and is not paid) the
same as any other judgment. 34 C.J. 10088, par 1534, 34
Am. Jur. Section 143, . . ."
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Although not a case in which installments of child
support are being enforced, Buell v. Duchasne Mercantile Co., (1924), 64 Utah 391, 231 P. 123 is to the point.
The court there said, "When a judgment is rendered payable in installments, the statute of limitations begins to
run against it from the time fixed for the payment of
each installment for the part then payable." quoting
from 23 Cyc. 1510. Citing Section 6455, Comp. Laws
Utah 1917 (the provision of which is now found at U.C.A.
78-12-22,) said, ". . . that action on a judgment must be
instituted within eight years." and so held in the case
to support the trial court's decision accordingly.
The fact that Buell is not a child support case, and
had an established fixed total amount to be paid in a
series of installments does not invalidate its message as
applied to the running of the statute of limitations against
individually accrued installments, because it is applying
the statute applicable to enforcement of judgments to
single installments, just as must be done in the present
case. In a case seeking to enforce payment of installments awarded by a final judgment, the rule of law is
that the statute of limitations begins to run on each
installment as it becomes due and payable. Such a rule
is even more appropriate in the situation where the
plaintiff is attempting to enforce a modifiable divorce
decree which ordered child support or alimony to be
paid in installments, because the rule provides greater
predictability and certainty of the law than would a rule
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predicted on the divorce decree itself. In each case the
amount of the individual installment became fixed when
it became due. The result in both cases should be the
same.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The computation of the defendant's arrearages in
child support payments must include application of some
statute of limitations because of the policy of the law
that dictates that litigation be finally put to rest and
stale claims be abolished. Laches is appropriate defense,
but requires more than mere passage of time, something
more must be shown which in far too many cases cannot
be shown. The Statute of Limitations Section 78-12-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, by its terms is applicable to
all civil actions. Actions of the type of the present action
are civil, so the statute of limitations applies to all actions
for payment of accrued alimony and/or child support.
Since each installment that has become due and payable
is like a final judgment ,the eight year period of limitation or Section 78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
applies to each installment and begins running on the
day the installment becomes due.
For that reason, in any computation of arrearages
in alimony or child support only those accrued and unpaid installments occurring within the eight year period
preceding a determination by the court of the arrearage
may be considered.
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In the alternative, should the court conclude that
Section 78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, does not
apply then it follows that Section 78-12-25 would apply,
and the period of limitation applicable to the present
case would be four years.
Under Section 78-12-22, the arrearages of the defendant and therefore the judgment appealed from
should be revised by the court to be $3,040.00. Under
Section 78-12-25, the amount of the judgment appealed
from should be reduced to $1,150.00.
In the alternative, the Court should reverse the
judgment appealed from and remand the case to the District Court for the purpose of recomputation of the
judgment amount and directing a judgment in the recomputed amount.
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